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Abstract
Structured finance instruments represent a form of securitization technology which can be defined
by the characteristics of pooling of financial assets, de-linking of the credit risk of the asset pool
from the credit risk of the originating intermediary, and issuance of tranched liabilities backed by the
asset pool. Tranching effectively accomplishes a "slicing" of the loss distribution of the underlying
asset pool. This paper reviews the finance literature relating to security design and securitization, in
order  to  identify  the  economic  forces  underlying  the  creation  of  SF  instruments.  A  question
addressed  is  under  what  circumstances  one  would  expect  to  observe  pooling  alone  (as  with
traditional securitization) versus pooling and tranching combined (as with structured finance).
It is argued that asymmetric information problems between an originator and investors can lead to
pooling of assets and tranching of associated liabilities, as opposed to pooling alone. The more
acute the problem of adverse selection, the more likely is value to be created through issuance of
tranched asset-backed securities. Structured finance instruments also help to complete incomplete
financial markets, and they may also appear in response to market segmentation.
JEL-classification: G10, G12, G20.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
Structured finance instruments represent a form of securitization technology which can be defined
by three key characteristics: (1) pooling of financial assets (such as loans, bonds, or credit-default
swaps); (2) de-linking of the credit risk of the asset pool from the credit risk of the originating firm
1,
usually through use of a finite-lived, special purpose vehicle (SPV); and (3) issuance by the SPV of
"tranched" liabilities backed by the asset pool. Tranching accomplishes the division of cash flows
from the asset pool into separate classes of liabilities with differing risk and return characteristics.
Tranching is often used to create securities with differing levels of seniority, thereby accomplishing
a "slicing" of the loss distribution of the underlying asset pool.
Tranches are defined by their "attachment" and "detachment" points; that is, the critical levels of
defaults  in  the  underlying  asset pool at  which, respectively,  the  tranche holder begins suffering
losses  and  the  tranche  becomes  exhausted.  As  an  example,  consider  a  structured  finance
instrument with three trances. The most junior tranche - referred to as the "equity tranche" - will
begin suffering losses once there are any defaults in the asset pool. Once this tranche is exhausted
(i.e., the level of defaults associated with its detachment point has been reached), the tranche next
in line, the "mezzanine" tranche, will begin earning losses. When the mezzanine tranche becomes
exhausted, the senior tranche begins earning losses. Senior tranche holders will thus only suffer
losses once equity and mezzanine tranche holders have lost all of their investments; that is, only in
extremely adverse circumstances.
The  structured  finance  (SF)  market  has  grown  dramatically  in  recent  years.  Given  the  benefits
conferred by SF products on both issuers and investors, this growth may be expected to continue in
the future
2.  Financial intermediaries’  motivations for issuing structured finance instruments include
access  to  new  sources  of  funding,  reduction  of  economic  or  regulatory  capital,  and  arbitrage
opportunities. Investors are motivated by portfolio diversification and the expectation of attractive
risk-return profiles in an environment of low interest rates.
Tranching  is  the  key  feature  that  distinguishes  structured  finance  instruments  from  traditional
securitization products (sometimes referred to as pass-through instruments). The latter are typically
composed  of  pools  of  large  numbers  of  loans  (e.g.,  residential  mortgages  or  credit-card  loans)
which have been transferred (de-linked) from the originator's balance sheet to an SPV, which then
sells shares in the pool. Another feature that distinguishes some SF from traditional securitization
products is the nature of the underlying assets: SF products are often made up of pools of relatively
small  numbers  of  assets  acquired  through  financial  markets,  rather  than  large  pools  of  loans
1  The term originating firm, or originator, refers to the financial intermediary originating the assets. In the case
of loans, this will be the lender. In the case of assets such as bonds, which are traded in financial markets,
the originating firm will be the intermediary, e.g., an investment bank, which has purchased the assets in
the market and whose balance sheet contains the assets prior to de-linking.
2  See CGFS (2005) for available data relating to the size of the market and the range of participants.2 NBB WORKING PAPER No. 71 - JULY 2005
originated  by  a  financial  intermediary.  The  assets  included  in  the  SF  pool  may  also  be
"unconventional", such as tranches of other structured finance instruments (e.g., a collateralized
debt obligation (CDO) made up of tranches of other CDOs).
This paper reviews the finance literature relating to security design and securitization, in order to
identify  the  economic  forces  underlying  the  creation  of  SF  instruments.  One  of  the  questions
addressed is under what conditions the issuance of structured finance instruments creates value;
that  is,  what  explains  the  appearance  of  this  market?  A  second,  related  question  is  when  a
structured finance product would be expected to be used rather than a traditional securitization, or
pass-through instrument. The paper's main focus is on the economic value created by the features
of pooling and tranching.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the concept of asset-backed securities and the
feature  of  de-linking.  Section  3  discusses  the  emergence  of  SF  instruments  as  a  response  to
problems of asymmetric information. This section also addresses issues relating to governance of
the SPV and, by definition, of the SF transaction. Section 4 identifies other sources of value creation
via SF; namely, market completion and arbitrage opportunities arising from segmented markets.
Section 5 offers some concluding remarks.
2.  ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES AND DE-LINKING
Finance literature makes the distinction between the sale of an asset and the sale of a security
backed by the asset (or a pool of assets). In the abstract, a security issued by any nonfinancial firm
represents an asset-backed security, where the underlying assets include all of the firm's capital,
both physical and human. However, in the case of a financial intermediary - which has financial
assets on its balance sheet - the sale of a financial asset can be clearly distinguished from the sale
of a security whose return is backed by the asset. One question that arises with respect to any
asset-backed security is: What is the optimal form of the security (e.g., debt or equity)? Questions
that  arise  specifically  with  respect  to  asset-backed  securities  issued  by  financial  intermediaries
include the following. When should assets be pooled and shares in the pool issued (i.e., a pass-
through instrument), as opposed to the assets being sold individually? If asset-backed securities are
issued, should two or more securities with heterogeneous characteristics (e.g., debt and equity) be
issued against the assets? In other words, should the asset-backed securities be "tranched" by
splitting the cash flows?
Given that the debt and equity of any firm, nonfinancial or financial, in effect represent asset-backed
securities, the intuition of the Modigliani-Miller theorem - which is typically discussed in connection
with nonfinancial firms - can be brought to bear to the case of asset-backed securities issued by
financial intermediaries. This theorem states that in a world of perfect financial markets, with noNBB WORKING PAPER No. 71 - JULY 2005 3
information asymmetries and with all securities tradable in liquid markets, tranching - or the creation
of multiple types of securities backed by the firm's (or the SPV's) assets - would not add value, as
the structure of the firm's liabilities would be irrelevant. Hence, market imperfections must exist in
order  for  tranching  (and  SF  instruments  more  generally),  to  be  profitable.  Market  imperfections
giving rise to value creation via the issuance of tranched liabilities backed by a pool of assets, and
discussed  in  more  detail  below,  include  asymmetric  information,    market  incompleteness,  and
market segmentation.
An additional motivation underlying the issuance of both traditional securitization and SF products is
pointed out by Duffie and Garleanu (2001), who note that securitization (i.e., pooling) can improve
the liquidity of many types of assets by increasing the number of potential buyers. For example, the
number of buyers willing to bid for an individual loan to an unknown firm may be very small and
costly to find. Independently of the existence of other types of market imperfections, transaction
costs can be reduced and liquidity improved by pooling homogeneous loans and selling shares (or
tranches) in the pool.
One of the key features of the asset-backed securities issued by financial firms is de-linking. This
feature is characteristic of both traditional securitizations and SF products. The de-linking of assets
resembles secured borrowing, but nevertheless generates benefits for financial intermediaries and
investors which go beyond those of classical secured loans. The resemblance of SF to secured
borrowing  derives  from  the  use  of  collateral  (i.e.,  the  underlying  asset  pool)  to  back  the  SF
securities  and  from  the  fact  that  the  collateral  will  not  come  under  court  jurisdiction  should  the
originating firm file for bankruptcy. Yet, despite the provision of collateral, structured finance differs
from classical secured borrowing in that payments to the secured creditors (i.e, the holders of the
notes issued by the SPV) are affected only by the performance of the de-linked asset pool (since
the  assets  have  been  transferred  from  the  originating  firm's  balance  sheet)  and  not  by  the
performance  of  the  originating  firm.  While  defaults  in  the  underlying  asset  pool  will  lower  the
payments to the  SPV note  holders, other factors, such as  poor performance by the  originator's
management, should have no impact
3.
3.  ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
3.1  Asymmetric information and tranching
Different  participants  in  financial  markets  -  firms,  financial  intermediaries,  rating  agencies,  and
investors - typically have varying amounts of information about, or differing abilities to determine,
3  To the extent that the structured finance instruments includes loans in the underlying asset pool that were
originated by the originator and the originator is designated as the servicer for the loans in the asset pool,
then poor performance of the management could impact the performance of the loans.4 NBB WORKING PAPER No. 71 - JULY 2005
the  value  of  securities  offered  in  the  market.  Two  types  of  asymmetric  information  problems
commonly arising for nonfinancial firms include the following: (1) a firm issuing a security has more
information about the potential cash flows associated with the security than do investors; (2) some
investors have more information about a security's value (or better ability to value the security) than
other investors; i.e., some investors are "informed" whereas others are "uninformed."
The sale by financial intermediaries of financial assets on their balance sheets or securities backed
by these assets also gives rise to these two asymmetric information problems. For example, an
intermediary originating loans will often have more information about the value of the loans than will
potential  investors  if  the  loans  are  offered  for  sale.  In  addition,  a  third  type  of  asymmetric
information problem appears with financial institutions: (3) intermediaries originating loans may be
less informed about the ultimate market value of their assets than are investment banks which may
serve as arrangers; i.e., who  purchase the assets, repackage them by pooling them with assets
originated by other intermediaries, and sell the repackaged assets or securities backed by these
assets.  Arrangers  will have better  information about  market  values  of  assets  when  their  pricing
models are better than those used by the originators. Also, whereas each originator may have good
knowledge of the cash flows from its own assets, it does not generally possess data on the cash
flows  from  other  originators'  pools,  in  contrast  to  arrangers,  who  may  have  access  to  such
information.
Asymmetric information and general security design
The literature on general security design (by nonfinancial firms) provided the initial intuition relating
to tranching. This literature initially focused on the first adverse selection problem mentioned above.
A paper that is indirectly related to this literature is the classic paper by Leland and Pyle (1977),
which analyzes a situation where the owner of a firm or project has private information about the
project. In this setting, when the owner wants to issue equity to fund the project, the amount of his
own funds invested in the project will be interpreted as a signal of its quality. In equilibrium, the
higher the quality of the project, the greater the amount of equity that will be retained by the owner,
and the higher will be the market valuation of the firm.
Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) focus on the second problem of asymmetric information. That is, they
consider financial markets with informed and uninformed investors and find that in this context there
is  scope  for  "splitting"  the  cash  flows  from  an  asset  to  create  multiple  types  of  securities.  In
particular, these authors consider an environment with a capital good and a consumption good.
Informed  investors  are  assumed  to  be  able  to  observe  returns  to  capital,  whereas  uninformed
investors are not. In the absence of financial intermediaries, informed investors can form coalitions
and benefit from "insider" trading in financial markets (of the capital for consumption good). The
trading strategy of the coalition is chosen in such a way that prices do not fully reveal to uninformedNBB WORKING PAPER No. 71 - JULY 2005 5
investors  the  state  of  nature,  which  allows  the  informed  investors  to  obtain  a  profit  from  their
information.
One  means  by  which  uninformed  investors  can  protect  themselves  is  to  form  financial
intermediaries and to have the intermediary split its cash flows by issuing safe deposits (riskless
debt) to the uninformed investors and equity to informed investors. With this solution the uninformed
investors, who invest only in deposits, no longer have to trade with informed investors. This model
thus offers not only a rationale for tranching but also one potential explanation for the existence of
intermediaries.  Note,  however,  that  the  tranching  strategy  could  also  work  by  having  private,
nonfinancial  firms  issue  a  riskless  debt  security  directly  to  uninformed  investors  and  equity  to
informed  investors,  providing  that  riskless  debt  could  be  issued.  In  the  case  of  a  financial
intermediary, the government may have to provide deposit insurance in order for the intermediary's
debt to be riskless.
Boot and Thakor (1993) employ intuition similar to that of Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) to argue
that in asset markets with asymmetrically informed investors it is optimal for firms to split their cash
flows through a senior/subordinated security design. A major difference between the two models,
however, is that the optimal security design in Boot and Thakor is supply-driven (i.e., modeled from
the security issuer's point of view) rather than demand-driven. Boot and Thakor actually assume
three types of investors: (1) those who are informed about the quality of the firm issuing securities;
(2) those who are uninformed about issuer quality and whose demand for the security is random
and exogenous; (3) and those who can choose to become informed at a cost. The latter category of
investor will make the decision to become informed or not after having observed the aggregate
demand for the security by the other two groups, and the decisions of the third category of investors
will effectively determine the profitability to the firm of issuing different types of securities. Investors
in  the  third  category  also  resemble  somewhat  a  market  maker
4,    or  perhaps  an  arranger  in  a
securitization context.
Boot and Thakor consider the case of a firm issuing a single security (therefore, the supply of the
security is fixed) and where informed investors learn the firm's type ("good" or "bad") with certainty.
Once the group of potentially informed investors - the third investor category - have observed the
aggregate demand by the other two categories (and without being able to distinguish the demands
of each category), the potentially informed investors decide whether to become informed or not,
based upon whether it is profitable to become informed
5.  In equilibrium, the proportion of potentially
informed investors who have chosen to become informed will be such that profits from becoming
4  These  investors  may  are  like  market  makers  in  the  sense  that,  after  having  observed  the  aggregate
quantity demanded by the other two groups, they are assumed to invest in a quantity of the security such
that the resulting equilibrium price yields them zero expected profit.
5  It  will  be  profitable  to  become  informed  if  the  conditional probability  that  the  firm  is "good", given  the
observed aggregate demand, is high enough so that the expected return to potentially informed investors of
becoming informed exceeds the cost.6 NBB WORKING PAPER No. 71 - JULY 2005
informed have been driven to zero; the marginal potentially informed investor would earn zero profit
by incurring the cost to become informed.
Boot and Thakor compare the firm's profit when it issues a single security (equity) paying out the
cash flows from the assets versus two securities: one a riskless, senior security (debt) and the other
a  junior  security  (equity).  In  the  latter  case,  it  is  assumed  that  some  random  proportion  of  the
uninformed  investors  invest  in  the  junior  security
6.    The  firm's  profit  from  issuing  two  securities
relative to a single one will be positively related to the incentive of the potentially informed investors
to become informed when two securities are issued. Boot and Thakor show that it is more profitable
for the firm to issue multiple securities, with "information insensitive" cash flows paid to the senior
security holders and "information sensitive" cash flows paid to the subordinated security holders.
The extra information sensitivity of the junior security relative to the single-security case increases
the  incentive  of  potentially  informed  investors  to  become  informed  and  results  in  a  higher
equilibrium price for the issuer.
Boot and Thakor also provide some intial intuition as to why pooling of assets (followed by issuance
of tranched securities) might be profitable for a firm. If, rather than learning the firm's quality with
certainty,  informed  investors  receive  noisy  signals  of  quality,  then  pooling  of  assets  can  help
investors diversify against the idiosyncratic noise in the quality signal received for each firm.
Asymmetric information in securitization and structured finance
DeMarzo  and  Duffie  (1999)  analyze  the  first  asymmetric  information  problem  in  the  context  of
securitization  by  a  financial  intermediary  which  desires  to  raise  cash  -  for  example  in  order  to
acquire more profitable assets - via the sale of a single security backed by an asset (or portfolio of
assets). At the time that the originator sells the asset-backed security, it will have private information
about  the  expected  cash  flow  from  the  portfolio;  therefore,  there  will  be  an  adverse  selection
problem similar to that analyzed by Leland and Pyle. The model of DeMarzo and Duffie, however, is
more general than that of Leland and Pyle, in that the issuer chooses the optimal security design
(as  opposed  to  simply  issuing  equity,  as  assumed  by  Leland  and  Pyle).  Moreover,  the  issuer
chooses from among all possible security designs. In addition, the issuer chooses the quantity of
security (i.e., cash flows) to sell; hence, supply is not fixed.
As  noted  above,  DeMarzo  and  Duffie  analyze  a  situation  where  the  security  issuer  is  informed
about the value of the assets, and all investors are uninformed. Similarly to the results of Leland
and Pyle, one consequence of the adverse selection problem is that the quantity of the security that
the  intermediary  decides  to  sell  will  serve  as  a  signal  regarding  the  assets'  cash  flows.  In
6  It is necessary to have at least some uninformed investors (liqudity traders) investing in equity, because if
only informed investors invested in this security, it would be possible for the potentially informed investors
to costlessly determine the firm's quality.NBB WORKING PAPER No. 71 - JULY 2005 7
equilibrium,  the  price  that  investors  are  willing  to  pay  for  an  asset-backed  security  will  be  a
decreasing function of the share of the securitized portfolio that the originator wishes to sell. The
originator sells a smaller proportion of a security if the quality of the underlying assets is high.
DeMarzo and Duffie show, in addition, that the design of the security has an impact on the severity
of the adverse selection problem. It may, for example, be possible for the originator to issue riskless
debt, if the cash flows from the assets are known by investors always to exceed some minimum
level. This would avoid the adverse selection problem altogether. However, issuing riskless debt
would  require  the  originator  to  retain  a  certain  proportion  of  the  assets'  cash  flows,  and  this
proportion  may  be  higher  than  desired,  given  the  originator's  objective  of  raising  cash.  The
originator thus faces a tradeoff between the desire to sell the security in order to obtain cash and
the reduced liquidity of the security (lower price) - due to the adverse selection problem - when high
enough quantities are issued.
Importantly, in the model of DeMarzo and Duffie the security design is chosen prior to the issuer
acquiring the private information about the assets' cash flows (e.g., the asset portfolio backing the
security may not yet have been completely assembled at the point where the design is chosen).
This implies that the security design itself can not be a signal of the originator's private information;
rather, the design is chosen subject to the knowledge that an adverse selection problem will exist at
the time when the security is sold. More precisely, DeMarzo and Duffie assume that at the point at
which the security is designed, the issuer has not yet acquired private information about the cash
flows from the assets; however, the issuer will have acquired the information prior to deciding the
quantity of the security to sell. These assumptions can also be used to describe the case of an
informed arranger, who designs the security prior to acquiring the assets from an originator and
then  who subsequently  acquires private  information  about  the  assets,  e.g.,  from  a good  pricing
model, prior to selling the security.
With respect to the optimal security design, DeMarzo and Duffie find that when it is possible to
contractually base the security payments on the cash flows of the underlying assets (i.e., when the
cash flows of the assets are "verifiable"), then under some rather general conditions, standard debt
is the optimal form of the security. The standard debt security pays a given face value, unless the
cash flows of the assets are less than this face value, in which case the security holders receive the
entire cash flows from the assets. Standard debt turns out to be optimal because it is the least
information-sensitive  security  design  from  among  all  other  designs  meeting  the  same  general
conditions
7.  In addition, the greater the desire for the issuer to obtain cash, the higher will be the
face value set for the debt, and the more the security will resemble equity
8.
7  In other words, the expected payoffs to debt holders will change less in response to increases in the
originator's private information when the security is of the form of standard debt than with other security
designs.
8  The debt security would be transformed into equity if the face value were set at the maximum possible
value of the assets' cash flows.8 NBB WORKING PAPER No. 71 - JULY 2005
As noted above, in contrast to the case of a nonfinancial firm, a financial intermediary can decide
between  the  sale  of  an  asset  and  the  sale  of  an  asset-backed  security.  This  gives  rise  to  the
question  of  when  a  financial  intermediary  wishing  to  raise  cash  would  prefer  to  sell  assets
individually versus issuing an asset-backed security. DeMarzo (2004) uses an extended version of
the model of DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) to  address this question. More precisely, DeMarzo asks
when an intermediary would prefer to sell assets individually versus pooling the assets and selling a
share in the pool. Then, he asks whether, in the case of an asset-backed security, the intermediary
would prefer to issue differing tranches as opposed to a pass-through instrument. Finally, DeMarzo
also analyzes these choices for the case where the third type of asymmetric information problem
exists;  namely,  where  arrangers  are  informed  but  originators  and  investors  are  not.  DeMarzo
contrasts these results with the results obtained for the case corresponding to the first asymmetric
information problem, where the originator is informed but investors (including the arranger) are not.
DeMarzo first considers the situation where originators are privately informed about the values of
their assets, and they sell these assets (or securities backed by the assets) to uninformed investors.
Then, DeMarzo analyzes the case where originators are uninformed relative to arrangers, who may
purchase assets from the originators, repackage them, and sell them to uninformed investors. In
both cases, the informed party (originator or arranger) is assumed to have the incentive to raise
cash by selling some portion of the assets (or cash flows) on its balance sheet. As in DeMarzo and
Duffie (1999), the existence of private information implies that the fraction of the security sold will
serve as a signal of its quality. In equilibrium, the fraction sold by the informed originator will be a
declining function of the asset's quality.
DeMarzo derives two major results relating to the case of an informed originator. The first result is
that the informed originator would prefer to sell the assets individually than to pool them and sell
shares in the pool (a pass-through instrument). In other words, sale of individual assets dominates
pooling for the originator. The intuition underlying this result is that by selling each asset individually,
the originator can choose the optimal fraction to sell of each asset, thereby maximizing the benefit
of the private information. When the assets are pooled, some of the benefits of this information will
be lost (an "information destruction" effect), since the fraction of the security that the originator sells
must be based on the average quality of the pool.
The second result, however, is that the combination of pooling and tranching may be preferred by
the  originator  to  the  individual  sale  of  assets.  This  result  implies  that  in  certain  circumstances
pooling and tranching the assets will be preferred to individual sale. When pooling and tranching is
the preferred method, the pooling of the assets creates a diversification benefit (arising from the
idiosyncratic  risk  embodied  in  each  asset),  and  this  diversification  benefit  is  greater  than  the
information destruction cost mentioned above. An example of a case where pooling and tranching
would  be  preferred  to  individual  sale  of  assets  would  occur  when  the  value  of  each  asset  isNBB WORKING PAPER No. 71 - JULY 2005 9
composed  of  a  privately  observed  component  and  a  "nonprivate"  component,  and  when  the
nonprivate component contains an idiosyncratic element that is "important enough." Alternatively, if
the private information on asset values is "general", in the sense that the  private information is
correlated across assets, then pooling and tranching would be more likely to be preferred than if the
private information is specific to each asset.
For the case where originators are uninformed and informed arrangers exist, DeMarzo's results
change. Now the originator may prefer simple pooling of the assets, and the originator's incentive to
pool will be greater the larger is the potential size of the pool. The intuition is that when informed
investors (the arrangers) as well as uninformed investors exist, a new adverse selection problem
arises. Uninformed investors know that they are competing with informed investors who can identify
and purchase the highest quality assets; hence, uniformed investors will be willing to pay less for
the assets available to them than if there were no informed investors. Thus, underpricing arises as a
result of the adverse selection. The originator can mitigate the underpricing problem - and raise the
price that the originator obtains - by pooling the assets, thereby reducing the precision with which
the informed investors can make their selection.
The  analyses  of  the  two  cases  -  informed  originators  and  uninformed  originators  with  informed
arrangers  -  leads  DeMarzo  to  specify  a  dynamic  model  of  financial  intermediation  in  which
originators sell pooled assets, which are purchased either by uninformed investors in the form of
pass-through instruments or by informed intermediaries who repackage the assets (by pooling with
other assets) and issue tranches backed by the repackaged assets. Even if originators pool and
tranche their assets, informed intermediaries may have an incentive to further pool the tranches and
sell the repackaged assets to uninformed investors. Finally, the ability to pool and tranche assets
relative to individual sale leads to a higher growth rate for the originator (or arranger), by increasing
the quantity of assets that it is able to sell and thus increasing the quantity of more profitable assets
that it may acquire.
3.2  Asymmetric information and transaction governance
The literature discussed  to  this point  suggests that  when securities are tranched, less  informed
investors  are  more  likely  to  purchase  the  senior  tranches  and  more  informed  investors  the
subordinated tranches. Suppose that the tranched security is an asset-backed security where the
assets  have  been  "de-linked"  and  the  tranched  securities  issued  by  an  SPV.  How  should
governance, or control, of the transaction (in particular, substitution of nonperforming assets in the
underlying  portfolio)  be  determined?  That  is,  who,  if  anyone,  should  take  responsibility  for
restructuring  the  portfolio  if  some  of  the  underlying  assets  become  nonperforming?  Riddough
(1997) addresses this question in the context of a model of asset securitization where the junior
security holder is better informed than the senior security holder. The greater information of the
junior security holder suggests that this investor is better placed than the senior security holder to10 NBB WORKING PAPER No. 71 - JULY 2005
undertake portfolio restructuring in the event of poor performance. However, a conflict of interest
between  the  security  holders  arises  in  this  case.  Just  as  the  equity  holders  of  a  firm  have  an
incentive  to  take  more  risk  (i.e.,  engage  in  risk  shifting)  than  bond  holders  and  may  want  to
inefficiently continue the firm in operation when it is insolvent, so may the subordinated security
holders of an asset-backed transaction have the incentive to take actions that delay liquidation of
the portfolio even when liquidation would be the efficient option. Alternatively, when the underlying
assets are securities that are tradable in financial markets, the subordinated note holder may have
an incentive to replace non-performing assets with substitute securities of low credit quality but with
high yields. Both of these types of actions by subordinated note holders would be opposed by the
senior security holders.
The conflict of interest created by granting the informed junior security holder control rights thus
leads to a governance problem. As suggested above, this conflict of interest bears some similarity
with the conflict of interest arising between debt and equity holders of a long-lived firm. Yet, there
are also some important differences. For the long-lived firm, as long as it is highly profitable (i.e., in
"good"  times),  the  interests  of  the  equity  holders  and  debt  holders  will  be  aligned.  The  equity
holders effectively hold a call option on the firm with exercise price equal to the face value of the
debt. In good times this option is in the money, and the equity holders' interest in the long-term
survival  of  the  firm  argues  for  giving  them  control  over  the  firm.  However,  as  the  firm's  profit
decreases and bankruptcy becomes likely (i.e., in "bad" times), the equity holders' option moves out
of the money, which creates incentives for the equity holders to gamble with the firms' assets at the
debtholders' expense. Consequently, equity holders generally lose control in bad times
9.
Unlike a long-lived firm, the SPV (or equivalently, the structured finance transaction), is of limited
duration. In addition, because the underlying assets are most often fixed-income, there is only a
very  limited  "upside"  that  could  be  generated  via  management  or  control  of  the  transaction.
Management's  role  becomes  important  only  when  defaults  occur  in  the  portfolio  or  when
prepayments are made on loans in the asset pool and the cash needs to be reinvested. In addition,
SF equity holders have an incentive to try to capture as much return as early on as possible, in
order to insure themselves of earning the "required" rate of return. Thus, the conflict of interest
between the junior and senior classes of claimants is present from the beginning of the transaction.
The design of transaction governance must take account of this conflict of interest.
A number of potential solutions to the SF governance problem exist. First, as suggested above, the
junior security holder could be granted control rights; however, in this case,  senior noteholders
would require additional ex ante subordination (for protection against the junior security holder's
actions), which could be quite costly. Second, the junior security holder could be granted control,
9  A common feature of bankruptcy laws in most countries is to transfer control of the firm from shareholders
to either the debtors or a court-appointed administrator. Chapter 11 of the U.S. bankruptcy law constitutes
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but  with  limitations  imposed  ex  ante  on  its  actions.  Next,  a  third  party  could  be  designated  to
manage the portfolio. However, if this manager must hold one or more of the tranches in order to
signal a commitment to properly managing the portfolio, then the conflict of interest would reappear
at the asset manager level. The final possibility is to have an unmanaged, or static, transaction in
which  no  modifications  of  the  original  portfolio  are  allowed.  This  alternative,  however,  can  also
prove costly, since the lack of asset substitutability would limit the ability for all note holders to
benefit from early identification and substitution of non-performing assets. In practice, the structural
provisions of managed structured finance instruments impose strict contractual limitations on the
actions that note holders and/or third-party managers can take. Indeed, much of the contractual
structure  of  SF  transactions  is  devoted  to  specifying  the  rights  and  responsibilities  of  the
noteholders, asset managers, and other third parties involved in the transaction. These provisions
take the place of the discretionary control rights granted to equity holders in long-lived firms.
4.  MARKET COMPLETION, MARKET SEGMENTATION, AND ARBITRAGE
4.1  Market completion
In an "Arrow-Debreu world" with perfect and complete markets, financial innovation via the issuance
of new types of securities cannot be profitable for firms or add value for investors, since the cash
flows from any new security can be replicated by a combination of existing securities. Indeed, when
markets are complete, the price of any new security can be uniquely determined by computing the
price corresponding to the combination of existing securities which replicates the new security's
cash  flows.  When  markets  are  incomplete,  however,  adding  new  types  of  securities  can  be
beneficial if the securities help to complete markets.
Ross  (1976)  was  the  first  to  demonstrate  that  contingent  claims  written  on  existing  assets  can
improve efficiency by completing markets. Ross also notes, however, that many of the "states of
nature" for which markets are incomplete are idiosyncratic to individual investors. If SF arrangers
are  able  to  identify  the  sources  of  market  incompleteness  for  certain  groups  of  investors,  then
issuing  SF  instruments  may  be  profitable,  provided  that  the  investors  can  obtain  diversification
benefits by adding the SF tranches to their portfolios
10.
One difficulty faced by issuers of SF securities, however is that it is not possible to determine a
unique price for new securities whose cash flows cannot be spanned by existing securities. The SF
issuer must find a price that makes the costly structuring profitable and that precludes arbitrage in
10  Interestingly, JPMorgan (See, Meli and Rappoport, 2002) has found that equity tranches of small size have
very low correlations with either bonds or equities. As equity tranche size increases, the correlations with
stocks and bonds increase. Yet, because smaller equity tranches have more variable returns (a smaller
tranche  can  be  completely  depleted  with  fewer  defaults),  equity  tranche  investors  must  trade  off  high
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the market. In addition, the issuer would like to find the most profitable structure, or design, for the
new security.
Gaur et al (2003) build on these ideas to devise  an algorithm to show how an originator or an
arranger can take advantage of incomplete financial markets by "packaging" assets via pooling or
via pooling and tranching. If the packaged assets help to complete markets, then the market will
place a premium on them, and the originator can profit from pooling and possibly tranching the
assets. Gaur et al show that the optimal strategy for maximizing the value of the assets is to "strip
away" the portion of cash flows which can be spanned by existing assets - and, therefore, for which
a unique price can be determined - and to sell the remaining portion to investors at a price which
earns  a  profit  to  the  seller  and  precludes  arbitrage. Whether  to  create  tranches  backed  by  the
pooled assets and how many tranches to create are decision variables in the issuer's optimization
problem.  The  profitability  of  tranching  relative  to  pooling  alone  will  be  determined  by  the  price
bounds within which the tranched securities can be sold and which prevent arbitrage.
The model of Gaur et al follows a body of literature that attempts to place bounds on arbitrage-free
prices in incomplete markets. In Gaur et al the "monopoly" seller acts as a price taker, in the sense
that it must operate within the bounds dictated by the prices of existing securities, as well as the
demands  of  buyers  in  "thin"  markets.  As  Gaur  et  al  note,  "thus,  even  though  the  market  is
incomplete, there is demand from individuals who are willing to buy unspanned claims at arbitrage-
free prices." This suggests that knowledge of specific investors' demands may be quite important
for SF issuers, a topic which is discussed in more detail in the following section.
4.2  Market segmentation
Segmentation in financial markets gives rise to arbitrage opportunities which may be exploited by
originators or arrangers in creating SF products (i.e., in undertaking pooling of assets and tranching
of liabilities as opposed to pooling alone). In fact, market segmentation can create two different
types of arbitrage opportunities. First, restrictions imposed by preferences, investment mandates, or
regulation may limit access by particular groups of investors to certain securities or cash flows that
might otherwise be desirable
11.  Access to private information about individual investors' demands
may allow an arranger to design tranches of SF instruments to fit the individual investors' needs;
i.e.,  to  achieve  the  desired  cash  flows  without  violating  the  constraints  faced  by  investors.  The
arranger takes advantage of knowledge of an investor's demand by practicing price discrimination
and capturing part of the premium that the investor is willing to pay for the tailored product.
11  For example, some institutions are required to confine their investments to only very highly rated securities.
Others are allowed only to hold investment-grade assets, with the obligation to sell assets which have been
downgraded to noninvestment grade levels. Still other institutions, such as certain high-yield mutual funds,
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A  second  arbitrage  opportunity  arises  when  market  segmentation  leads  to  pricing  differentials
among assets which may be included in the underlying collateral pool of SF products. One such
arbitrage opportunity derives from differences in corporate bond spreads across rating categories,
which may result at least in part from market segmentation. It is indeed a well known stylized fact
that average corporate bond spreads are typically higher than the spreads that would be predicted
based on default risk alone. Moreover, the magnitudes of the differences appear to vary across
ratings  categories.  Along  these  lines,  a  sizeable  empirical  literature  has  been  devoted  to
understanding the determinants of bond spreads. (See, for example, Elton et al (2001) and the
references cited therein.)
JPMorgan has developed a technique for estimating the minimum spread on a class of bonds that
would be necessary to compensate investors for the default risk (taking into account both expected
loss and variance of loss)
12.  This spread is labeled the "rock-bottom spread". Comparison of the
differences between average market spreads and the rock-bottom spreads across rating categories
reveals  that  as  one  moves  down  the  ratings  spectrum  from  AAA  to  BB  bonds,  the  difference
between the market spread and the rock-bottom spread increases. However, this difference turns
negative  for  bonds  rated  B  and  below.  That  is,  market  spreads  do  not  appear  to  compensate
investors for the risk associated with B-rated bonds. Although market spreads on B and lower-rated
bonds have exhibited considerable variation over time, the negative difference between the market
and rock-bottom spread appears to be robust.
The explanation put forward by JPMorgan for lower market spreads than rock-bottom spreads for
very  low-rated  bonds  is  a  narrow  focus  by  high-yield  bond  fund  investors  on  yields  alone
13.
According  to  JPMorgan,  the  demand  for  noninvestment-grade  bonds  is  so  high  relative  to  the
supply that prices are driven to a level such that the spread does not fully compensate for the
default  risk.  JPMorgan  also  cites  market  segmentation  as  an  explantion  for  variations  in  the
difference between market and rock-bottom spreads across other rating categories. For example,
institutions which are not allowed to hold noninvestment-grade debt know that if a BBB-rated bond
in their portfolio is downgraded, they will have to sell the bond at just the moment when many others
will have to sell it, implying a sharp drop in price. Consequently, in order to be willing to hold BBB
bonds, these institutions require a premium.
What do structural differences in demand across bond rating categories - and resulting differences
in bond spreads relative to default risk - imply for SF instruments? Depending upon the spreads
prevailing in any given period, arrangers may be able to assemble portfolios of cheap, lower-rated
12  See Rappoport (2001) and Meli and Rappoport (2003).
13  Interestingly, several academic studies have found that lower-rated bonds pay higher yields without having
a higher standard deviation of returns.  However, these studies do not include bonds rated below BBB.
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bonds  (e.g.,  BB),  create  a  tranched  CDO,  and  earn  a  sufficient  spread  to  pay  themselves  fee
income,  to  pay  the  highly  rated  tranches  the  market  spreads  that  are  consistent  with  observed
spreads for bonds of equivalent risk, and to distribute an acceptable return (the "excess spread"
minus fees) to the equity tranche
14.
According to this logic, and given the observation of market spreads below the spreads necessary
to compensate for default risk for B-rated bonds, one might conjecture that equity tranches of CDOs
based on portfolios of B-rated bonds would not earn high returns. This is indeed what JPMorgan
concluded from a recent study of the returns that representative CDO equity tranches would have
earned on portfolios of bonds of different ratings during the period from 1984-2002
15.  During this
period equity tranches based on BBB and BB bonds would have earned high returns given their
risk, whereas equity tranches based on B bonds would have underperformed.
It should be noted that in order for either of the two types of arbitrage opportunities related to market
segmentation to be effective - that is, to provide an arranger the incentive to undertake the costs of
structuring a transaction - it must be impossible for other "arbitrageurs" to enter the market and
drive  the  profit  from  tranching  to  zero.  As  Oldfield  (2000)  points  out  for  the  case  of  structured
mortgage  securities,  an  arranger  can  profit  from  tranching  only  if  it  possesses  some  sort  of
comparative  advantage;  for  example,  with  respect  to  acquisition  of  the  assets  included  in  the
collateral  pool,  the  costs  of  structuring,  or  privileged  access  to  information  about  clients'
preferences. To the extent that other intermediaries can acquire identical assets and have equal
access to the same clients, any potential profit from tranching may be quickly driven to zero. These
arguments  suggest  that  "unconventional"  assets  may  lend  themselves  more  easily  to  SF
transactions than do assets that are more "standardized" and trade in thick markets. Indeed, as
noted earlier, CDOs often contain nonstandard assets such as SME loans, tranches of other SF
instruments, or leveraged loans.  Alternatively, when standardized assets such as corporate bonds
are  included  in  a  SF  product,  close  client  relationships  and  private  information  about  clients'
demands likely represent the main source of profit to the arranger from tranching.
14  This  strategy should  be differentiated  from another potential strategy, that  of "rating agency  arbitrage"
which some observers have accused SF arrangers of undertaking in the past. In particular, because bonds
within any given rating category trade at differing spreads, it is possible for an arranger to assemble a pool
of bonds trading at the highest spreads within a rating category and to take advantage of the "extra" spread
earned relative to the average spread for that category. The problem is that the credit risk of such an asset
pool will generally be higher than the credit risk of the average bond in that rating category; consequently,
defaults in the CDO portfolio may be significantly higher than investors had expected.
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5.  CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has reviewed finance literature, with the aim of identifying the sources of value creation
in  the  structured  finance  market.  It  argues  that  asymmetric  information  problems  between  an
originator and  investors can  lead to  pooling  of  assets  and  tranching  of  associated  liabilities, as
opposed to individual sale of assets or to pooling alone. The more acute the problem of adverse
selection,  the  more  likely  is  value  to  be  created  through  issuance  of  tranched  asset-backed
securities. Asymmetries of information between differing groups of investors can also lead to the
issuance of tranched securities; less informed investors purchase the senior tranches, which will be
insulated  to  a  greater  or  lesser  extent  from  default,  and  informed  investors  purchase  the
subordinated tranches.
Structured finance products can also create value for originators, arrangers, and investors when
these products help to complete markets by offering investors securities with cash flows that are
specifically  tailored  to  their  individual  needs.  A  necessary  condition  for  arrangers  to  have  an
incentive  to  design  such  tailored  securities,  however,  is  that  the  arrangers  can  practice  price
discrimination due to market segmentation or that they possess some other type of comparative
advantage relative to competing arrangers, such as a cost advantage in acquiring the underlying
assets. Market segmentation likely plays an important role in determining the profits that arrangers
can earn from structuring.
Finally, the spreads on the assets included in the collateral pool must be high enough relative to the
spreads paid to the tranche holders to permit arrangers (and other third parties) to earn fees to
cover  the  structuring  costs.  This  suggests  that  the  composition  of  asset  pools  of  newly  issued
structured finance instruments is likely to vary over time, in unison with movements in the spreads
on  different  classes  of  assets.  Widening  spreads  for  a  particular  asset  class  will  increase  the
incentive for arrangers to create SF instruments with this class included in the collateral pool.16 NBB WORKING PAPER No. 71 - JULY 2005
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